Afghanistan 2019: Preparing For Change

By Fawad Hasan Fawad | July 2019

Alittle over 17 years after forcing its way into Afghanistan in the name of the “War on Terror” (WoT), the Americans are looking for a quick way out. Not surprisingly though, even the exit needs to be orchestrated exactly on their terms. The garb of coercive messenger is being worn this time by Zalmay Khalilzad — who in his recent visits to various capitals, including Islamabad, is pushing a stance not much different from what Richard Armitage took at his time: “you are either with us or against us”. Initial outcome of the talks looks promising enough to generate a lot of confidence on all sides but a lot of ground still needs to be covered.

It is ironic though that Americans have reached a stage of exodus after losing over two thousand US and NATO soldiers — spending over $1.5 trillion of the US and EU taxpayers’ money in the name of protection against terrorism. While US Homeland Security can proudly claim that it has not allowed a repeat of 9/11, its NATO allies cannot. The EU capitals continue to face increasing terror attacks which accelerates their decent into increasingly divisive and polarized socio-economic polities for the first time after the 2nd World War. More than anything else, European societies are at war with themselves, imploding from within rather than by any external threat, as right-wing politics take control of the parliaments which until now had remained flagbearers of moderation and equality. Apart from this, the turmoil in the entire region and the disastrous consequences for Pakistan, in particular, amount to hundreds of billions of dollars, for which no one wants to account.

Recent weeks have seen frantic efforts by the Americans to fast track a solution that can bring an end to hostilities in Afghanistan through a cease-fire agreement between belligerent Taliban forces and an increasingly fragile Afghan National Government, which appears to be shrinking inside Kabul in spite of US and NATO presence. Part of the US solution, which is primarily driven by Trump’s domestic political realities and the need to deliver a fundamental change on “America First” claims before the 2020 presidential race sets in, aims at a phased but complete disengagement from Afghanistan after a power sharing agreement between Taliban and other Afghan political forces. To that end, Trump has been at war with its non-NATO ally Pakistan even before taking office as he continued to accuse them of harboring segments of Afghan Taliban, allegedly involved in subversive activities in areas controlled by the Kabul regime.

President Trump started 2018 with his infamous new-year tweet highlighting wastage of $33 billion of US aid to Pakistan and pledging to hold them accountable while freezing any further economic and military assistance. The fact, however, remains that even before the end of the calendar year, The Pentagon was still holding a much more conciliatory position for its long standing partner in WoT in South Asia and President Trump himself spoke much more generously about Pakistan at the start of 2019. The recent meetings with Taliban and Afghan Government along with other stakeholders did see Pakistan playing the long demanded role, to whatever extent was possible for them, of bringing Taliban to the negotiation table. While little is known of the discussions around the table and behind closed doors in the latest round of talks, one really wonders how an increasingly resurgent Taliban will spoil fruits of their 15 years’ struggle by agreeing to take a secondary role in any future dispensation in a country which is theirs for the taking once the occupying forces leave. They can, however, always agree to any dispensation for the interim period which can assure departure of occupying forces in an agreed timeframe. What will happen thereafter is the writing on the wall even if President Trump does not wish to read through that at the moment.

For Pakistan, the emerging situation presents new challenges. Even after playing the most decisive role in the WOT, particularly in decimating Al-Qaida at both leadership and operational levels and suffering massive human and material losses incomparable to those suffered by any other country, it may not find the emerging power scenario in Afghanistan to its liking if the US policy makers have their say in the final outcome. With Zalmay Khalilzad, a known Pakistan skeptic, back as the key US negotiator, Pakistan has started a fresh attempt at bringing peace to Afghanistan with an inherent deficit. The American policy makers have spent the better part of the last decade in trying to strengthen the Indian foothold in Afghanistan as their new strategic partners in South Asia. They have found a willing partner in India — for whom a disturbed western border for Pakistan and a friendly regime in power in Afghanistan, meant a marginalized Pakistani presence on their own borders. The fact that it was able to forge a broad-based strategic partnership between RAW, its largely Pakistan-centric intelligence arm and the NDS, the increasingly anti-Pakistan intelligence outfit of Afghanistan under both Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani for most part of the last decade, means a massive victory. Simultaneously, the launch of CPEC as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Chinese desire to play a more assertive role in containing the Afghan crisis, raised the Indian stakes even further. To them, any increase in Chinese influence in Afghanistan neutralizes their strategic hold there vis-à-vis Pakistan which to them remains unacceptable. Ironically, they have also found sympathetic ears in both Pentagon and on the Hill as Trump’s America feels threatened by both rising Chinese influence in the region as well as the so-called strategic objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”). The convergence of US/Indian interests in Afghanistan is therefore, likely to result in more blatant US support to a strong Indian foothold as they see Indian presence as a buffer between China and Pakistan. For them, it also provides an additional safeguard against re-emergence of any strategic partnership between post US/NATO Taliban and Pakistan of which they have always remained wary — even after Pakistani security forces have cleared the tribal areas of both south & nort Waziristan on Afghan border which were never occupied by any organized military force in its centuries old history. For the moment however, President Trump sees massive political gains at home followed by increased fiscal space once US inevitably walks out of its formal commitments or at least massively reduces them once US troops exit Afghanistan — if this can be acheived within the timeframe of 2020 Presidential elections in the US, President Trump will definitely be able to rally his far-right voter base in the US to his advantage; perhaps decisively.

On the other hand, our repeated assurances to both Kabul and Washington that a peaceful Afghanistan remains in Pakistan’s vital interests have at best been noted in both capitals. While American thought process has been largely influenced by their strategic preferences of a partnership with India as well as much larger regional and global geo-political priorities, the decision makers in Afghanistan remain preoccupied with the strength Taliban can derive from their popular support in Pakistan in the post US/NATO Afghanistan. They also steadfastly refuse to acknowledge the sacrifices made by our people and armed forces in the last four decades starting from Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The continued presence of over 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan even after four decades and the privileges they continue to enjoy at the cost of a large number of our own impoverished people have at best drawn ceremonial acknowledgements, lacking both conviction and substance. It is also ironic that an increasing number of decision makers, academia and even youth in Afghanistan look at Pakistan suspiciously and blame it for most of their woes primarily because the US sponsored Afghan governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani found it easy to use this as a pretext for their failures and massive corruption — which has seen over US $1.5 trillion evaporate in thin air over last 17 years, while President Trump continues to remind Pakistan of comparatively negligible sums most of which came as reimbursement of our expenses on WoT.

Policy options for our Foreign Office as we start a potentially turbulent 2019 in the context of the future of Af-Pak relations, peace on our western borders, impact of any possible turmoil, a new power struggle in Afghanistan and above all an increasingly important role that India is being sponsored to play in Afghanistan once US/NATO forces leave. In my humble view the following need to be prioritized:

• Continue to support all efforts of peace and reconciliation and also express this commitment at all bilateral and multilateral forums;
• While continuing to do that, also apprise all stakeholders, members of Security Council, key NATO member states and regional countries about the perils of any strategic role assigned to India in post US/NATO Afghanistan;
• Ensure by playing a consultative role that any power sharing arrangements based on ethnicity or sects disregarding the ground realities of tribal and ethnic composition of Afghan society at large are not forced on its people;
• Align our policy support and options with our Chinese friends since we have many common interests in the region as well as potential threats from an unstable Afghanistan;
• Increase our engagement with Turkey, Russia, Iran and Central Asian states regarding the critical significance of a peaceful and self-governed Afghanistan for the future of South/Central Asian region;
• Chalk out a detailed plan to increase people to people contact particularly focusing on policy makers, intelligence community, academia and above all, the Afghan youth;
• Increase our engagement with the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) with a view to find a respectable solution for early return of all Afghan refugees to their homeland; and,
• Resist the temptation of claiming too much as our doing in this process because while no one will give us much credit for any positive outcomes, all failures will invariably be blamed on us.

I do not know why at this stage I am reminded of some of the conclusions drawn by Robert Grenier, former CIA station Chief at Islamabad during 9/11, who also worked as Director of CIA, counter-terrorism centre later on. In his postscript written in 2013, of a first-hand account of the fall of Taliban “88 days to Kandhar” (originally written in 2005) Grenier concludes: “After a span of a dozen years, the longest war in American history, we have succeeded in killing Osama Bin Laden and degrading the organization responsible for attacking on our shores. But regarding arguably our most important objective – to deny South-Central Asia as a future safe haven for international terrorists – a combination of unwise policies, inept execution and myopic zeal has produced a situation arguably worse than the one with which we started.”

One just wishes that for once US policy makers do not see Afghanistan as their base station given in control of a strategic ally for limiting their own fiscal and human costs — without realizing the potential of destabilization in the region, more importantly between two nuclear armed neighbors, particularly when Modi’s India will see this as an excellent opportunity to play the Afghan proxy against Pakistan. They will also do well to remember the prophetic advice of John Quincey Adams, Secretary of State in 1821, that while United States stood for universal principles, it need not always export these principles or enforce them abroad — instead it could be a “well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all while being champion and vindicator only of its own.”